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Abstract 
A static bioeconomic model of a marine reserve allowing asymmetric density dependent 
migration between the reserve and the fishable area is introduced. This opens for habitat or 
ecosystem differences allowing different fish densities within and outside a reserve, not 
described in earlier studies. Four management scenarios are studied; a) maximum harvest, b) 
maximum current profit, c) open access and d) maximum sustainable yield (MSY) in the 
reserve. These are all analysed within the Induced Sustainable Yield Function (ISYF), giving 
the relationship between the fish abundance inside the reserve and the harvesting taking place 
outside. A numerical analysis shows that management focused on ensuring MSY within the 
reserve under the assumption of symmetric migration may be negative from an economic 
point of view, when the area outside the reserve is detrimental compared to the reserve. 
Furthermore, choice of management option may also have negative consequences for long 
run resource use if it is incorrectly assumed that density dependent migration is symmetric. 
The analysis also shows that the optimal area to close, either a more or a less attractive 
ecosystem for the resource in question, may differ depending on the management goal.  
 
Key Words: bioeconomics, marine reserves, migration, management 
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Introduction 
In most biological studies the main goal of the implementation of marine reserves is stock or 
ecosystem conservation. The political motivation behind the introduction of marine reserves 
has also mainly had this focus. Recently, however, economic studies of marine reserves have 
shifted focus towards taking into account the economics of the fisheries as well (Holland and 
Brazee, 1996; Hannesson, 1998; Sanchirico and Wilen, 1999, 2001, 2002 and Smith and 
Wilen, 2004). Hence the possibility of using marine reserves as a fisheries management tool 
has emerged. In the aftermath of the failures first of input controls, and then also to some 
degree of output controls in fisheries, the attention has now reverted back to a more complete 
form of input control, in the shape of closed areas.  This article studies a general bioeconomic 
model allowing asymmetric density dependent dispersal of resources between a marine 
reserve of a given size, and its adjacent area, presenting how a set of different management 
goals and standard equilibrium results are affected by this new management tool.  
 
The ecological conditions within a reserve can be expected to differ from conditions outside a 
reserve, depending on exploitation and habitat effects. This may be the case both regarding 
the relationship between species and within single species. Inside a reserve no species are 
subjected to harvesting pressure, and their relative densities may be very different to that 
found outside the reserve. For instance, in lieu of intense fishing upon a predator species 
outside a reserve, the density of prey may be higher outside the reserve than inside, due to 
greater predatory pressures within the reserve. On the other hand, intense fishing upon a prey 
species may lead to lower concentration of the predator outside the reserve due the 
competition with the harvesters. One would here expect there to be lower concentrations of 
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prey outside the reserve, due to this competition. Furthermore, some exploitation may cause 
habitat degradation outside the reserve, leading to greater concentrations of species within the 
reserve. However, increased numbers or predation within the reserve may for instance reduce 
space or success for breeding and the like, that is decrease the attractiveness of the habitat 
within the reserve, thereby increasing the density outside the reserve. Hence depending on 
these density effects, we may expect migration between the reserve and the outside area to be 
affected in such a way that density dependent migration may be asymmetric. That is, there 
may be migration in or out of the reserve despite the densities being the same in both areas 
and the equilibrium densities may differ in the two areas.  
 
In this article we model a marine reserve with asymmetric dispersal between the reserve and 
the outside area. This type of dispersal process has been discussed in biological research (see 
below), but was first modeled in a bio-economic context by Skonhoft and Armstrong (2005), 
in a purely terrestrial context1. In the bio-economic literature a simpler version of this type of 
dispersion function is used by amongst others, Conrad (1999) and Sanchirico and Wilen 
(2001), who both assume symmetric dispersion2. Though many models presented in the 
literature allow for differing habitat conditions (see Schnier, 2005, for a broad analysis of this), it 
is assumed that the densities of fish in these different habitats are equal, via the assumption of 
symmetric density dependence. The contribution of this paper is therefore to allow for differing 
fish densities, an occurrence which has been observed in nature in many instances (see Attwood 
et al., 1997, for an overview), but not formally allowed for in the literature. This article 
expands the model in Skonhoft and Armstrong (2005) to a marine analysis, and studies how 
the dispersal asymmetry affects the management of the outside area. Another contribution of 
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the paper is the introduction of the Induced Sustainable Yield Function (ISYF), giving the 
relationship between fish abundance in the reserve and harvesting taking place outside, 
offering a novel way of comparing interests with regard to preservation within the reserve 
and harvest opportunities outside the reserve.  
 
We formulate a set of different management options; a) maximum harvesting, or MSY in the 
non-reserve area, b) maximum profit, or MEY in the non-reserve area, c) open access in the 
non-reserve area, and d) MSY within the reserve, or equivalently maximum dispersal out of 
the reserve. The first management option is the most usual biological management goal, 
commonly found in fisheries management around the world. The two next options describe 
optimal management and open access, or zero management outside the reserve in the latter 
case. Armstrong and Reithe (2001) discuss the issue of management cost reduction with the 
introduction of marine reserves combined with open access, alluding to the attractiveness of 
this management option in some fisheries. Managing the fishery outside the reserve is 
however in most cases a superior vehicle for rent maximisation, hence speaking for 
management option b). Nonetheless, most bioeconomic models of marine reserves do not 
study optimal management in the sense of maximizing economic rent outside the reserve area 
(for an exception see Reithe, 2002)3. The final management option focuses on physical output 
maximisation within the reserve. The actual implementation of marine reserves has so far had 
a clear motivation directed towards conservation, the focus often being specific habitats, but 
also species. In this context, and due to the increasing worry over serious stock depletion the 
last century (Botsford et al., 1997; Myers and Worm, 2003; and Jackson, et. al., 2003), the 
issue of maximising biomass output holds many attractions.  
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The analysis of the four management options is done analytically when possible, with 
numerical comparisons where necessary. Focus is upon how this general density dependent 
dispersal model affects results described for more specific models given in the literature, and 
opens for new insight in possibilities and limitations in the implementation of marine 
reserves. The evaluation of the various regimes concentrates on efficiency; that is, economic 
rent in the fishing area, and the degree of conservation measured as fish density in the 
reserve. The analysis is static, leaving issues of transitional dynamics, and discounting the 
future, as discussed by Holland and Brazee (1996), for future analysis. 
 
The article is organised as follows. In the next section the ecological model is presented. Here 
we also introduce the Induced Sustainable Yield Function (ISYF), In section three we study 
the different management goals presented above. A numerical analysis is done for the North 
East Atlantic cod stock in section four, followed by a discussion of the results in section five. 
 
The ecological model 
We consider a marine reserve and an outside area of fixed sizes4, and a fish population that 
disperses between the two areas. The areas are governed by some state authority, and fishing 
is allowed only outside the marine reserve. It is assumed that this property rights structure is 
perfectly enforced meaning that de jure and de facto property rights coincide. In the outside 
area harvesting takes place by commercial agents, and, as already indicated, there may be 
different management goals. We let one fish stock represent the populations of economic 
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interest, though one could also imagine this one stock being an aggregation of many 
commercial species present5.  
 
The population growth of the stock in the two areas is described as follows: 
 dX1/dt = F(X1) - M(X1,X2)        (1) 
                  = r1X1(1 - X1/K1) - m(ßX1/K1 - X2/K2) 
and  
 dX2/dt = G(X2) + M(X1,X2) - h       (2) 
                  = r2X2(1 - X2/K2) + m(ßX1/K1 - X2/K2) - h 
where 1X  is the population size in the reserve at a given point of time (the time index is 
omitted) and 2X  is the population size in the fishable area at the same time. 1( )F X  and 2( )G X  
are the accompanying logistic natural growth functions, with ir  ( 1,2i = ) defining the 
maximum specific growth rates and iK the carrying capacities, inside and outside the reserve, 
respectively. h is the harvesting, taking place only outside the reserve. 
 
In addition to natural growth and harvesting, the two sub-populations are interconnected by 
dispersion as given by the term 1 2( , )M X X assumed to depend on the relative stock densities 
in the two areas. 0m >  is a parameter reflecting the general degree of dispersion; that is, the 
size of the areas, the actual fish species, and so forth. Hence, a high dispersion parameter 
m corresponds to a fish stock with large spatial movement. The parameter 0β >  takes care of 
the fact that the dispersion may be due to, say, different predator-prey relations and 
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competition within the two sub-populations as the reserve causes change in the inter and intra 
species composition (see Delong and Lamberson, 1999, for modeling of such species 
relationships)6. For equal /i iX K , 1, 2i = , and when there is no harvesting, 1β >  results in an 
outflow from the reserve and could be expected in a situation with greater predatory pressure 
here, for instance due to there being no harvesting in the reserve. Hence, when mobile prey 
species choose specific habitats for enhanced feeding possibilities, hiding places and/or 
nursery areas (Fosså  et al., 2002 and Mortensen, 2000, describe this for deep water coral 
habitats), there can be an outflow surpassing that of when the relative densities do not 
involve β . On the other hand, when 0 1β< < , the circumstances outside the reserve are 
detrimental, creating less potential migration out of the reserve. Hence, as opposed to the 
simpler sink-source models found in the literature (cf. the sink-source concept of the 
metapopulation theory, see, e.g., Pulliam (1988), but also see the density dependent 
dispersion growth models analysed in the biological literature by Hastings (1982), Holt 
(1985) and Tuck and Possingham (1994)), this model incorporates possible intra-stock or 
inter-species relations that may result in different concentrations in the two areas; that is, the 
dispersal may be asymmetric. As indicated above, Conrad (1999) and Sanchirico and Wilen 
(2001) assume symmetric dispersion in their analysis. Hence, β =1 in their models. 
 
The above system is studied only in ecological equilibrium, and hence, 1 / 0dX dt = and 
2 / 0dX dt =  are assumed to hold all the time7. The 1X -isocline of equation (1) may be 
expressed as:  
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 2 2 1 1 1 1 1( / ( / )(1 / ))X K X K r m X Kβ= − − 1( )R X= ,    (3) 
 
and generally has  two roots; 1 0X = , and 1 1 1/X K m rβ= −  which may be either positive or 
negative. When negative, typically reflecting a situation with large spatial movement, 1( )R X  
will first slope downwards and intersect with the 1X -axis for this negative value, reach a 
minimum and then run through the origin and slope upwards for all positive 1X . When 
1 1/ 0K m rβ− > , 1( )R X  will slope downwards for all negative 1X -values and  reach a 
minimum in the interval 1 1[0, / ]K m rβ− . It then slopes upwards. The isocline is therefore not 
defined for 1X -values within this interval in the situation of modest spatial movement. 
Accordingly, whenever defined, 1( )R X will slope upwards, 1'( ) 0R X > .  
 
Adding together equations (1) and (2) when / 0idX dt = ( 1,2)i = , and combined with (3) 
yields: 
 1 2( ) ( )h F X G X= + =  1 1 1( ) ( ( )) ( )F X G R X h X+ = .    (4) 
 
In what follows this will be referred to as the Induced Sustainable Yield Function (ISYF), and 
gives the relationship between the fish abundance in the reserve and the harvesting taking 
place outside. This function represents therefore the harvesting ‘spill-over’ from the fishing 
zone to the reserve. 1( ) 0h X ≥  is defined for all 1 0X >  that ensures a positive 2X through 
equation (3). 
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ISYF will be the basic building block in the subsequent analysis. In the Appendix it is 
demonstrated that it will be upward sloping for small positive values of 1X , reach a peak 
value and then slope downwards. If 1 1/ 0K m rβ− < , so that 2 1( )X R X= is defined for all 
1 0X ≥ , we have (0) 0h = as 2 2 (0) 0X X= = and accordingly (0) (0) 0F G+ = . Thus, the ISYF 
intersects the origin. When 1 1X K= , we have 2 2X K β= from the 1X -isocline (3),  and hence 
1 2( ) 0 ( )h K G K β= + . The harvesting is then nil when 1β = , 1( ) 0h K = . In models with 
symmetric dispersal, the ISYF therefore intersects K1. Moreover, 1( ) 0h K > if 1β < . When 
1β > , 1( ) 0h K < , and the ISYF is therefore not defined. On the other hand, if 1 1/ 0K m rβ− >  
and the spatial movement is modest, 1( )h X is not defined over the interval [0, K1-mβ/r1], and 
1 1( / ) 0h K m rβ− = . However, also in this situation 1 2( ) ( )h K G K β= .  
 
Fig. 1 about here 
 
Fig. 1a depicts the ISYF for 0< 1β < (and 1 1/ 0K m rβ− < ),  which, as mentioned, is the 
situation when the circumstances outside the reserve are detrimental, hence creating less 
potential dispersal out of the reserve. In addition, the natural growth in the reserve is plotted. 
As equation (1) yields 1 1 2( ) ( , )F X M X X= in ecological equilibrium, the figure gives 
information about the size and direction of the dispersal between the two areas as well. 
Moreover, the natural growth in the outer area 1( ( ))G R X is seen in the figure as the difference 
between these two curves. The reserve may be either a source or a sink for the same amount 
of harvesting. However, when the harvest pressure is sufficiently high, the reserve becomes a 
source and fish flows out of the reserve. On the other hand, when the reserve stock is high, 
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the harvest is more modest and the reserve serves as a sink. This is seen in Fig. 1a where the 
natural growth in the reserve F(X1), and hence the migration M, is negative. With no 
harvesting, as already noted, fish flows to the reserve when 0< 1β < . Hence, if the outside 
area is detrimental as compared to the reserve, the reserve becomes a sink when there is no 
fishing or quite heavy fishing, depending on the relative sub-stock sizes. 
 
Fig. 1b depicts the ISYF when β >1, i.e. the conditions within the reserve are detrimental. We 
observe that as long as the ISYF is defined, migration out of the reserve is positive, and the 
reserve is a source. Similarly for the symmetric case of β =1, as portrayed in Fig. 1c.  
 
The various harvesting scenarios 
Based on the ISYF, various harvesting scenarios are analysed. Altogether we will study four 
regimes, with the evaluation of the regimes basically following two axes; the rent or 
profitability of the fishery, and ‘sustainability’ as measured by the fish abundance in the 
reserve. In all cases, the influence of the dispersal parameter β will be of main concern. As 
mentioned, the four scenarios or regimes, to be studied are: a) Maximum harvest, or msyh ,  b) 
Max current profit, or meyh , c) Open access, or h∞ , and finally, d) Maximum sustainable 
yield in the reserve, or maximum dispersal out of the reserve mmh .  
 
a) Maximum harvest msyh  
In this regime we are simply concerned with finding the maximum value of the ISYF.  When 
1 1( ) / 0dh X dX = , equation (4) yields 1 1 1'( ) '( ( )) '( )F X G R X R X= − . As this equation is a third 
degree polynomial for the specified functional forms, it is generally not possible to find an 
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analytical solution for 1X , and hence 
msyh . However, it is seen that this solution may either be 
characterised by ' 0F > together with ' 0G < , the opposite, or simply ' ' 0F G= = . In Fig. 2, 
which gives management options for 0< 1β <  , msyh is described when ' 0F <  and ' 0G > .  
 
When taking the total differential of the above condition characterising msyh , it is not possible 
to say anything definite about what happens when β  shifts up. However, there is good reason 
to suspect that a higher β  will give a higher msyh as more fish then, ceteris paribus, flows out 
of the reserve and adds to the fishable population. This is confirmed by the numerical 
examples in the next section. 
 
Fig. 2 about here 
 
b) Maximum current profit meyh  
To assess profitability, effort use has to be included. When introducing the Schaefer function 
2h qEX= with E being effort use and q being the catchability coefficient, the current profit 
reads 2( / )p c qX hπ = − . p and c are the unit landing price and effort cost, respectively, both 
assumed to be fixed. The profit maximising problem is accordingly to 
maximise 1( / ( ))p c qR X hπ = − , subject to 1( )h h X= .  
 
For various reasons (see also below) the most illuminating way to solve this problem is to 
work with isoprofit curves. When taking the total differential of the profit and keeping 
π fixed, _π π= (cf. Fig. 2), the slope reads 
2
1
1
1
/ ( )/ '( ) 0
( / ( ))
hc qR Xdh dX R X
p c qR X
= − <− . It can be 
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shown that the isoprofit curves are quasiconcave, and the profit level increases outwards in 
the 1X h− plane. The tangency point between an isoprofit curve and 1( )h X  therefore gives 
the solution to this problem and meyh . Compared to the previous case a) problem of 
finding msyh , it follows directly that the stock abundance in the reserve will be larger under the 
present management goal of profit maximisation. See also Fig. 2. This fits with the intuition 
and is not very surprising as there are no forces (e.g., discounting) that counteract the 
working of stock dependent harvesting costs. 
 
As the β  parameter influences the isoprofit curves as well as the ISYF , it is difficult  to say 
anything analytically about how, say, a situation with 1β >  compared to the standard models 
with 1β =  influences profitability, the amount of harvest and the stock abundance in the 
reserve. We will return to this in the numerical analysis in the next section. However, because 
the ISYF is affected only by the ecology, and not the economy, it is clear that a higher price-
cost ratio gives a less negative slope of the isoprofit curves, and hence a lower stock in the 
reserve. Accordingly, the result is a higher harvest meyh . The economic reason is that more 
effort is introduced in the outer area accompanied by a smaller stock here, and this 
unambiguously affects the reserve. The dispersal M  therefore always increases under such 
circumstances either through increased outflow, or through reduced inflow into the reserve 
(the latter which happens only when 0≤β≤1). 
 
c) Open access h∞ .  
When applying the standard open access assumption that the profit π equals zero, the stock in 
the fishable area reads 2 /X c pq= . When inserting into equation (1) in equilibrium, we find 
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an explicit expression for the stock size within the reserve as 
21
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 2
41 (1 )
2
K m m mcX
r K r K r K K pq
β β⎡ ⎤= − + − +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
. This solution may also be seen in light of the 
ISYF as the isoprofit curves asymptotically approach the open access stock size 
1( ) /R X c pq=  when the profit approaches zero, cf. the above expression for the slope of the 
isoprofit curve (see also Fig. 2). Depending on the size of β as well as the other ecological 
and economic parameters, the open access stock size in the reserve may be either below or 
above that of the msyh level. If, say, the price-cost ratio is high, and hence the effort level is 
high, we may typically find that the reserve stock will be lower than msyh . A high price-cost 
ratio, as depicted in Fig. 2, therefore also works in the direction of a low stock abundance in 
the reserve, and the mechanism is just as in the previous case (cf. also Sanchirico and Wilen, 
2001). 
 
While the open access stock size outside the reserve is unaffected by the degree of 
asymmetry in the dispersion as well as the other biological parameters due to the Schäfer 
harvesting function assumption, we observe that a higher β  means a smaller open access 
stock in the reserve. Hence, 1β > , implying detrimental conditions within the reserve, 
reduces the stock size compared to the standard models with 1β = . The reason for this is that 
a higher β , for a fixed density in the outer area, means more dispersal. In a next step, this 
translates into a higher natural growth through the equilibrium condition 
1 1 2( ) ( , )F X M X X= , and hence, a smaller stock abundance. The effect on the size of the 
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harvest is, however, unclear as the 1X  stock associated with h
∞ may be either located to the 
right or the left hand side of the stock associated with msyh . 
 
The dispersal between the areas under open access may also be calculated, and after some 
tedious rearrangements we find 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2
4(1 ) (1 )
2
m m mc cM m
r K r K r K K pq K pq
β β β⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤⎪ ⎪= − + − + −⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
, 
which may be either positive or negative. The stylized fact situation of heavy harvesting 
pressure outside the reserve due to the nature of open access makes the reserve a source, 
0M > , and this is the situation depicted in Fig. 2. On the other hand, favorable conditions in 
the reserve so that 1β < , combined with a low price-cost ratio and a low harvesting pressure, 
may give an inflow to the reserve even under open access.  
 
d) Maximum sustainable yield in the reserve, or maximum dispersal out mmh . 
Maximum dispersal out of the reserve coincides with the maximum natural growth level 
within the reserve, 1 / 2K , as equation (1) yields 1( )F X M=  in equilibrium. Hence, we 
have 1 1 / 4M r K= as the maximum dispersal which is independent of the size of β as well as 
the economy, and the ecological parameters in the outer area. The corresponding stock level 
here becomes 2 2 1 1( / 2)( / 2 )X K r K mβ= − when inserting into 1( )F X M= . A higher β  
translates therefore unambiguously into a higher fishable stock size under the management 
option of maximum dispersal, and the effect is quite substantial as we have 
2 2/ / 2X Kβ∂ ∂ = (cf. also the numerical examples below). 
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It is also possible to find an analytical expression for the harvest by inserting for 2X and 
M into equation (2) in equilibrium and solving for h. The result is 
2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1( )(2 )
4 2 2 4
mm r K r K r K r Kh
m m
β β= − − + +  which is independent of economic factors as well. 
This harvest may either be smaller or larger than that of the open access, or maximum 
economic yield. In Fig. 2, mmh  is depicted as being above the open access harvest level.  
However, when being lower than h∞ , lower profitability than that of the open access; i.e., 
negative profit, is possible (cf. the isoprofit curve in figure 2).  
 
Numerical illustrations  
The above regimes will now be illustrated numerically with data that fits the North East 
Atlantic cod fishery in a stylised way. The baseline parameter values are given in Table 1. 
The economic and technological data applied are for an average trawl vessel in the 
Norwegian fishing fleet, as trawlers harvest 60-70% of the total allowable catch (see 
Armstrong, 1999). The biological data are approximations of intrinsic growth rates and stock 
size described in Eide (1997) for the North East Atlantic cod stock. The total carrying 
capacity 1 2K K+  is divided in two parts, one held as a reserve, the other as the remaining 
fishable area. In the baseline simulations they are equal. Simulations allowing different K-
values were run, without this adding any further insight8. The dispersion parameter m  is set 
equal to 1300, illustrating the fact that the cod stock is highly migratory. Little is known 
about cod and density dependent migration, but it is clear that there are several important 
density dependent effects in the life-cycle of the cod; spawning, recruitment to the fishable 
stock, and cannibalism (Bogstad et.al.1994, and Eide, 1997). Hence, density dependent 
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dispersal between the fishable area and the reserve could be seen as an approximation of 
these effects, making closures relate to geographic areas in the migratory life-cycle of the cod 
stock. This fits in well with proposals made by some interest groups desiring closures of areas 
where young cod congregate, and yet others requiring closures of spawning areas.  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
As demonstrated above, the ecological parameter β  is crucial for what happens. This 
parameter will therefore be varied throughout the simulations and we use three different 
values for β , with 1.5β = and 0.5β =  representing either the reserve or the fishable area as 
detrimental, respectively. To compare with the standard model with symmetric dispersal, we 
also illustrate when 1β = . These results are found in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
In the following we analyse the numerical results from two main perspectives. We first 
compare the results as regards stock size, harvest, profit etc. of the different management 
options a)-d) for the two β  values. This focus is therefore inter-managerial, comparing the 
various management regimes to one another. The second perspective is how sensitive the 
different management regimes are to the value of β . This analysis shows how choice of 
management regime can be affected by the uncertainty of the ecological conditions inside and 
outside the reserve and is hence intra-managerial. 
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Inter-managerial comparison 
One striking observation when studying Table 2 is the fact that the maximum dispersal case 
d) gives negative profit due to the small stock size in the reserve and overall when 0.5β = . In 
actuality the situation of high effort level and negative profits will only emerge in the short 
term, by allowing some form of subsidy or alternative valuation of fishing activity, as no 
rational agent will otherwise continue harvesting past the 0 profit point. However, given this 
possibility, even the open access scenario c) yields higher stock sizes than hmm in the reserve 
when the outside area is detrimental (but 1.5β =  showed the opposite case). This clearly has 
management implications, and contrasts purely biological management to management where 
economic issues are included. For 1.5β =  the stock size 2X increases dramatically in the d) 
scenario compared to the other management schemes as anticipated from the theoretical 
analysis, and is just equal the maximum harvest case a). However, this equality is a construct 
of the parameter values, and under such circumstances we thus also have the highest natural 
growth in the fishable area 1'( ( )) 0G R X = , as msyh  is characterised by 
1 1 1'( ) '( ( )) '( )F X G R X R X= −   (cf. section three). The switch in the β value changes the 
scenario that gives minimum harvest from the open access case c) when 1.5β =  to the 
maximum dispersal out of the reserve case d) for 0.5β = . This may also clearly be relevant 
for management decisions.  
 
A switch is also found for lowest migration, existing under the open access case c) 
when 1.5β = , and the maximum economic yield case b) for 0.5β = . The Maximum current 
profit scenario gives the highest stock sizes, both inside and outside the reserve, compared to 
all the other scenarios. As already mentioned, this is quite reasonable since this is a static 
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analysis with no discounting involved so that the meyh  solution always take place to the right 
hand side of the peak value of the ISYF. Profits are considerably reduced when 0.5β =  as 
compared to when 1.5β = , and this is particularly so for the maximum dispersal case d). It is 
also seen that profits show greater variation between the various scenarios when β  is low. As 
would be expected, the profit maximising scenario b) demands the lowest effort, and open 
access c) results in the highest effort level. 
 
We observe that for neither 1.5β = nor 0.5β =  presented in Table 2 is the picture regarding 
stock size differences among the various scenarios the same as those we find on the Fig. 2 
ISYF. However, this does happen when we have the standard model of symmetric dispersal of 
1β =  in Table 2.  
 
When comparing 1β =  with 1.5β = and 0.5β =  in Table 2 we observe that the assumption 
of symmetry poses the greatest danger of overexploitation when the environment outside the 
reserve actually is detrimental, i.e., 1β < . Harvest levels would then be set too high for all the 
management options. This will especially be so for management option d) of ensuring 
maximum sustainable yield in the reserve. If alternatively the actual situation is such that the 
environment inside the reserve is detrimental and 1β > , quotas would be set too low under 
the assumption of symmetry. Only the open access harvesting c) would be lower than 
anticipated.   
 
 
Intra-managerial comparison 
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Looking at the effects of the increase in β upon the different management scenarios in Table 
2, we observe that 1X  is non-increasing for all cases. All scenarios obtain increased 2X for 
increased β , except the open access scenario c) where the stock level is unchanged as it is 
determined by the economic parameters only. As already observed, the change is particularly 
substantial for case d). The dispersal M is increasing under scenario a) and b), while it first 
increases and then decreases under the open access case c). Growth in the fishable area G  
increases under schemes a) and d) while it first increases and then decreases under the 
maximum economic yield case b). Under the open access case c) there is of course no change 
as the fishable stock, and hence, the accompanying natural growth, are determined by 
economic factors only. Harvest and profit increase for all scenarios except case c) where 
harvest decreases, and profits of course all the time remain zero. Not unexpected from the 
theoretical analysis, there is no clear pattern for the effort use E  as β  increases. 
 
As β  functions as a relative concept between the area within and outside the reserve, the 
analysis may indicate that depending on the management preferences, the chosen area to 
close may differ9. If the manager wishes to maximise harvests as in case a), closing the 
detrimental area is the best option. This is also so under the maximum profit scenario of b). 
On the other hand, if the goal is to maximise employment in the shape of effort as in the open 
access scenario c), the best option is to close the ecologically more attractive area; that is, the 
area with the lowest β . It is also seen that closing the most detrimental area is by far the best 
option under the maximum dispersal goal d). Indeed, doing the opposite may have substantial 
negative economic consequences.  
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Concluding remarks 
The ecological conditions within a marine reserve can be expected to differ from conditions 
outside a reserve due to exploitation and habitat effects. In the present paper this is analysed 
by assuming asymmetric density dependent dispersal between a reserve and an outside 
fishable area. It is demonstrated that this may give substantially different results compared to 
the standard models of symmetric dispersal. This is shown analytically by introducing the 
Induced Sustainable Yield Function (ISYF), and by running numerical examples. Altogether, 
four different management options are analysed. 
 
The comparisons between symmetric and asymmetric dispersal show that if the environment 
is detrimental outside the reserve, a situation easily imagined, there are clear dangers of 
incorrectly assuming symmetry when managing a fishery, as over-harvesting would ensue. 
As many reserves are imposed in order to protect unique habitats or habitats of special 
importance to marine life, this issue seems of great relevance.  Furthermore, a management 
scenario inside the reserve given by maximum sustainable yield, or maximum dispersal out of 
the reserve, has most serious consequences, in the shape of potentially negative profits and 
small total stock size, if it is mistakenly assumed that migration is symmetric when the actual 
situation outside the reserve is detrimental. 
 
The analysis may also indicate that depending on what the management goal is, the 
preferable areas to close may differ. Hence in the management of the North East Atlantic cod 
fishery, which from the Norwegian side (also Russia and other countries fish upon this stock) 
has had to answer for a plethora of management goals such as securing viable communities, 
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environmental requirements as well as economic aims, it is not clear as to which of the 
examples studied here should apply. In recent years, however, the economic goals have 
increasingly been underlined (Johnsen, 2002), and hence a management goal of profit 
maximisation combined with the closing of more detrimental areas would be relevant. This 
would presumably also be easier to get acceptance for politically, as the ecologically 
attractive areas are also usually the areas that have the greatest fisheries concentration and 
importance, but nonetheless contrasting the desire shown by biologists to close productive or 
pristine areas.  
 
The case of symmetric density dependence is overall quite improbable, as expecting different 
habitats or ecosystems to have equal densities seems a strong and idealized assumption. 
Hence when this idealized assumption implies serious consequences for management, as 
presented here, it should be applied with great care.  
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Appendix  
The ISYF curve  
For the specific functional forms, 1( )h X  will generally be a fourth degree polynomial. The 
ISYF is defined when 1( ) 0h X ≥ for all 1 0X > that ensures a positive 2 1( )X R X= . We only 
look at the case where the 1X -isocline is defined for all positive 1X  that is, 1 1/ 0K m rβ− < . 
We then have (0) 0h =  together with 1 2( ) ( )h K G K β= , and accordingly 1( ) 0h K = for 0β =  
and β=1, and 1( ) 0h K > for 0< 1β <  while not being defined when β >1 (see also the main  
text). Differentiation yields 1/ ' ' 'dh dX F G R= + . Because ' 0R > for all positive 1X , 
h increases for small values and decreases for large values of 1X .  We have extreme values 
when ' ' ' 0F G R+ = . This is a third degree polynomial, but we can suspect one peak value of 
1( )h X  in the actual interval. Furthermore, we find 
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1/ '' '' ' ' ' ''d h dX F G R R G R= + + . As we 
 28
have '' 0R > , 1( )h X  is strictly concave when ' 0G < , i.e., for large values of 1X . However, it 
may not hold for small values of 1X  as ' 0G > then is large and may dominate. Numerical 
simulations have confirmed that 1( )h X will reach one peak value when 1( ) 0h X > and be 
strictly concave for large values of 1X . 
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Table 1.  Baseline values; prices and costs, ecological parameters and other parameters.  
Parameter      Description                                                           Value             
1r             Maximum specific growth rate reserve  0.5 
2r             Maximum specific growth rate outer area  0.5 
1K            Carrying capacity reserve    2500 (tonne) 
2K            Carrying capacity outer area   2500 (tonne) 
m             Dispersion      1300 (tonne) 
p             Landing price fish     7.6 (NOK/kg)  
c              Effort cost      18.6 (mill NOK/ trawl vessel) 
q     Catchability coefficient    0.0066 (1/trawl vessel) 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table note: The price is based on average data for 1992, and the cost and catchability 
parameters are averaged over the years 1990-1993 (see Armstrong, 1999). Ecological data are 
approximations of Eide (1997). 
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 Table 2. The effects of different β values; 0.5β = ; the environment outside the reserve 
is detrimental, 1.0β = ; symmetric dispersal, 1.5β = ; and the environment inside the 
reserve is detrimental. Stock sizes iX (1000 tonne biomass), natural growth 1( )F X and 
2( )G X and harvest h (1000 tonne biomass), profitπ  (million NOK) and effort E  
(number of trawl vessels) 
 
β-value Management                 X1   X2   F(X1)=M      G         h            π         E 
 Scenario: 
0.5β =  a) Max harvest msyh  1950  563   215     218        432       1120       116 
b) Max profit meyh  2300  973     92     297          389      1831         61 
c) Open access h∞       1750   370    263     158         420            0        172 
d) Max dispersal hmm   1250     24    313       12          324    -3558      2045  
1.0β =  a) Max harvest msyh  1600  1046   288     304        592        2905       86 
b) Max profit  meyh  1800   1315    252     312          564        3076      65 
c) Open access  h∞     930   370    292     158         450            0       185 
d) Max dispersal hmm   1250    649    313      240          553        1801 129 
1.5β =  a) Max harvest msyh  1250 1274   313     312      625       3367           74 
b) Max profit meyh  1400 1508    308     299        607       3480           61 
c) Open access h∞          510   370    203     158       361             0         146 
d) Max dispersal hmm   1250  1274    313      312       625       3367   74  
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Figure captions 
 
Fig. 1a. The Induced Sustainable Yield Function; ISYF (0< β <1). 
 
Fig. 1b. The Induced Sustainable Yield Function; ISYF ( β >1). 
 
Fig. 1c. The Induced Sustainable Yield Function; ISYF ( β =1). 
 
Fig. 2. Harvest under a) Maximum harvest, or msyh ,  b) Max current profit, or meyh , c) 
Open access, or h∞ , and finally, d) Maximum sustainable yield in the reserve, or 
maximum dispersal out of the reserve mmh  (0 < β <1). 
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1 The history of terrestrial reserves is old, but these nature reserves appeared long after 
hunting had become completely marginalised compared to farming. Hence terrestrial reserves 
never had a commercial management approach. The oceans, however, still sustain a large 
degree of hunting, in the shape of fisheries, making the marine reserve approach a very 
different one to the terrestrial. The marine reserve focus is increasingly upon the area outside 
the reserve, while the terrestrial reserve concentrates on the conditions within the reserve.  
2 Sanchirico and Wilen (2001) initially describe a general model as presented here, but the entire 
analysis is done with more limiting assumptions with regard to dispersal. 
3 Sanchirico and Wilen (2002) and Sanchirico (2004) model limited-entry allowing some 
profits, while Conrad (1999), Sumaila and Armstrong (2003), and Schnier (2005) implicitly 
investigate optimal management by determining optimal reserve sizes through optimising 
simulation processes.  
4 Hence we refrain from studying optimal reserve size as done in Hannesson (1998). It is 
assumed that a given reserve is introduced, and the question remaining is how to manage a 
fishery in this context. 
5
 It is clear, however, that an aggregation of species could create compounding effects on the 
dispersal, not specifically discussed here. 
6 The parameter β may clearly be a dynamic variable that evolves over an adjustment period 
to a steady-state level. We are however focusing on steady-state equilibrium, following the 
creation of a marine reserve, and hence assume that β is constant. 
7 It can be shown that the 1X -isocline of equation (1) yields 2X as a convex function of 
1X while the 2X -isocline of equation (2), for a fixed h, is a concave function. The system 
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generally has two equilibria, where the one with positive X-values is stable (see also the main 
text below). Outside equilibrium, starting with for instance a small 1X  and large 2X , 1X  grows 
while 2X  initially decreases, before it eventually starts growing as well. During the 
transitional phase where both sub-populations grow, the dispersal may change sign with 
inflow into the reserve area being replaced by outflow; that is, the reserve area changes from 
being a sink to being a source. The same shift in dispersal may happen when starting with a 
small 2X as well as a small 1X .  
8 As could be expected, profits increase and stock size in the reserve decreases for smaller 
reserve size. 
9 Notice that due to the actual parameter values (cf. Table 1), the two areas are totally 
symmetric except for the value of β .  
 
